We examine what determines a firm"s decision to disclose the self-assessment report on its internal control (IC) system and to further attain an auditor"s attestation on the report, using a sample of firms from the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 2006-10. We hypothesize and find supporting evidence that the likelihood of having voluntary disclosure of IC selfassessment with an auditor"s attestation is positively related to future equity refinancing, mutualfund shareholdings, and whether the firm is controlled by the government, especially the central government. Our study also takes the identification problem into consideration, as our sample includes firms with IC weaknesses/deficiencies. Our study not only makes an incremental contribution to the literature, but also has practical implications, especially for regulators and investors in China.
INTRODUCTION
Internal control (IC) disclosure in corporate financial reporting is of considerable interest to both the academic and business communities, particularly following the passing of the SarbanesOxley Act (SOX). Nevertheless, few studies have examined the management incentives of IC reporting. According to Leone (2007) , this is partly because most prior research has been conducted in an environment of mandated IC disclosure, not voluntary IC disclosure. Bronson et al. (2006) and Deumes and Knechel (2008) are the only two exceptions.While the former focuses on the association between firm characteristics and voluntary IC disclosure, the latter does examine incentives for voluntary IC disclosure. Using a unique dataset from the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) during the period 2006-10, we examine not only why firms would choose voluntarily to disclose their IC self-assessment reports, but also why some of these firms prefer, in addition, to have an auditor"s attestation on these reports, a new aspect of the literature.
Owing to the fact that no IC weakness/deficiency is reported in their voluntary IC disclosure samples, Bronson et al. (2006) and Deumes and Knechel (2008) do not address the identification problem; that is, whether independent variables explain the presence/absence of IC weakness, or the presence/absence of disclosure, or both. With Chinese data, we can identify firms with IC weaknesses and therefore better examine the incentives and determinants of voluntary IC reporting and the option of including an auditor"s attestation on the report. This also distinguishes our study from the existing literature. SSE required its listed firms to establish the IC system and disclose the IC report as of 2006. However, the firm management has full discretion in releasing IC information due to the lack of a minimum requirement. For example, some firms report their ICs very briefly, with a statement such as "The IC system generally met the 2006 guidelines," whereas others provide detailed explanations of specific risk management, such as management control over subsidiaries, accounts receivable, accounts payable, etc. Some even provide the IC self-assessment with an external auditor"s attestation in the report.During our sample period, about 17.3% of SSE-listed firms voluntarily disclosed self-assessment with an auditor"s attestation and 12.7% only disclosed self-assessment in their IC reports. Self-assessment is important, as it reflects the board of directors" (BoD) view of the firm"s IC system and its disclosure may make the firm legally liable. Hence, voluntary disclosure in this study refers to the circumstances when a firm voluntarily discloses self-assessment in its IC report, not just the release of the IC report as generally required by the SSE. 1 The auditor attestation reflects an auditor"s view of the firm"s self-assessment report, which can enhance the credibility of the report if the auditor agrees with the BoD on self-assessment. According to the Ministry of Finance"s (MOF) interpretation of IC standards, issued in 2010, the self-assessment and auditor attestation are of particular importance in making the IC system effective in China.
No SSE firm had disclosed any IC weakness/deficiency in their IC reports up to 2008.
However, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) required that all listed firms must disclose IC weaknesses in their IC report if they had had any since 2009. It is worth noting that the mandatory disclosure of self-assessment in the IC report for all listed firms will not start until 2012. 2 Hence, in our latter sample period 2009-2010, the disclosure of IC self-assessment and auditor"s attestation is still voluntary, although some firms did report IC weaknesses. This unique feature of the data allows us to address identification problems when studying the 1 IC disclosure in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange is mandatory, as all firms listed there have been required by law to disclose IC information, such as self-assessment, since 2007. This is different from the IC legal environment in the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 2 For cross-listed firms, the mandatory disclosure of self-assessment started in 2011. The auditor"s attestation on IC reports is also mandatory, since 2012.
determinants of the voluntary IC disclosure and the decision to attain in addition an auditor"s attestation. Healy and Palepu (2001) point out that the main purpose of the voluntary disclosure of IC reports is to reduce information asymmetry and agency costs. From this, we can infer that attaining an auditor"s attestation can make IC disclosure more convincing and therefore further reduce information asymmetry and agency costs. Specifically, we argue that government ownership, institutional holdings, and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs)are the major determinants of the decision to have an auditor"s attestation on IC disclosure in China.
A unique feature of listed firms in China is that the government is the controlling shareholder in a large percentage of listed firms. This should have a significant impact on the IC disclosure and whether to attain an auditor"s attestation. Firstly, the Chinese Government may pursue objectives other than maximizing profit, which exacerbates agency problems between the controlling shareholder and small shareholders. As a grabbing hand, the government may prefer less transparency. However, the government also wants to revitalize the SOEs and would like to have their partially privatized companies operate according to international norm (see Sun, Tong, and Wu, 2013) . In the past 30 years, the government, especially the central government, has been the major force in pushing forward the SOE reform including privatization to establish the "modern enterprise system." Building up a sound IC system and disclosingIC information is part of such government efforts. Secondly, the government may not be an effective monitor, as it is often represented by officials or government agencies with various opportunistic tendencies, which worsens the traditional agency problem between managers and shareholders. The disclosure of IC self-assessment with an auditor"s attestation is very likely in the government"s interests as it can reduce information asymmetry and therefore reduce the public concern for controlling shareholder expropriation on the one hand, and mitigate the ineffective-monitoring problem associated with government ownership on the other. This can boost market confidence in listed SOEs and attract more private investors. Hence, we argue that SOEs in China are more likely to disclose anIC self-assessment report with an auditor"s attestation than non-government controlled firms.
Many authors 3 have pointed out that different types of government ownership in China can have different impacts on corporate governance, cash-dividend payments, etc. Therefore, we also examine whether there is a difference in the impact on IC disclosure when the central or local government is the controlling shareholder. It is likely that central-government-controlled firms have more incentive than local-government-controlled firms to disclose the IC selfassessment as the disclosure itself is encouraged by the central government. It is natural that the central government uses its directly controlled firms to showcase good corporate governance. It is also understandable that the managers of these firms are more likely to comply as their promotion depends heavily on how effectively they can carry out central government directions.
Local-government-controlled SOEs care more about the local governments" needs and wants, which may deviate from those of the central government. For example, local governments have to shoulder a variety of local social responsibilities such as employment and social welfare in their jurisdictions (Lin et al. 2004) . Hence, local government leaders have a strong incentive to pressure managers of local-government-controlled firms to pursue local interests rather than carrying out central government decisions when there is a conflict between them. Consistent with this prediction, prior research shows that local-government-controlled firms are more prone to overinvestment (Zhang and Wang 2010) , managing earnings (Chen et al. 2008) , having excess employees on their payrolls (Zeng and Chen 2006) , executing related party transactions that hurt minority shareholders" interests (Cheung et al. 2010; Jiang et al. 2010) , and having worse financial reporting quality (Chen et al. 2009 ).
Besides government ownership, a firm"s IC reporting decision may be affected by institutional shareholders. For example, Bronson et al. (2006) argue that institutional shareholder ownership is positively related to voluntary IC reporting. However, Deumes and Knechel (2008) argue Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that the information asymmetry would negatively affect a company when it is attempting to raise new equity capital in the market. Dechow et al. (1996) also suggest that firms issuing securities are more likely to commit fraud. Chen and Yuan (2004) and Yu et al. (2006) find that Chinese firms widely engaged in earnings management for rights issues up to 2003, which caused a lot of concerns among investors. Hence, managers in China should have an incentive to release their IC self-assessments with an auditor"s attestation to enhance the credibility of their financial information for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in subsequent years.
Our major findings are as follows. First, firms who have the government, especially the central government, as their largest shareholder are more likely to disclose their IC selfassessment with an auditor"s attestation, indicating that the Chinese government is under pressure not to take advantage of outside shareholders and to reduce its own agency problems with managers. Second, the more mutual-fund holdings there are, the more likely managers are to release their IC self-assessment with an auditor"s attestation, indicating that mutual funds have a positive impact on a firm"s transparency in China. Thirdly, firms with external equityrefinancing plans are more motivated to release their IC self-assessment with an auditor"s attestation. To our knowledge, this is the first documentation in the literature that equity refinancing plans give an impetus to voluntary IC-disclosure decisions. Fourthly, we find that some firms with IC weaknesses still voluntarily disclose their IC self-assessment and attain an auditor"s attestation. Mutual-fund shareholding can explain the choice to have IC disclosure and an auditor"s attestation among firms with IC weaknesses. However, for firms disclosing only the IC self-assessment report without the auditor"s attestation, the government control, mutual fund shareholdings, and SEO plans are not the determinants for their voluntary disclosure decisions.
On the other hand, the traditional determinants documented in previous studies, such as size, leverage, corporate governance variables, etc., do have significant impact on the disclosure decision. These findings have implications not only for China but also for emerging markets and transitional economies. In fact, the finding that equity-refinancing is an incentive to voluntarily disclose an IC report with an auditor"s attestation may have implications for all markets.
The next section briefly reviews the institutional background in China and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 details the sample selection and research design, while the empirical findings and additional tests are presented and discussed in Sections4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND HYPOTHESES

Background Information
The Chinese government has over the past decade taken a series of measures to strengthen the protection of small investors and bring the accounting and regulatory standards close to the international norm.
Stock-Market Development
China"s stock market has been developed out of share-issue privatization. Li et al. (2011) , the SSSR has deepened privatization and improved the liquidity of the stock market.However, the original tradable shareholders lost the safety buffer when all shares become tradable. Hence, it is more important to have the companies release IC reports and become more transparent.
Share trading in China used to be dominated by the individual investors, as most tradable shares were held by individuals and the market was highly speculative (see Mei et al. 2005 In 2001, the CSRC cracked down on the irregularities and fraudulent activities of listed firms and severely punished 30 firms (Sun et al., 2013) . In August of that year, the CSRC issued guidelines for establishing an independent director presence on the board of directors. It required that all companies must have more than one-third independent directors on their board before (including board membership) in any listed companies. Using the sample of firms that received public condemnations by the stock exchanges in China, Dong (2005) and Liu and Huang (2007) show that the stock prices react negatively to such news. 
Hypotheses
Using the above background information, we develop testable hypotheses below. In general, firms may choose not to issue the IC self-assessment when they have IC weaknesses. Even without IC weaknesses, firms may choose not to disclose IC self-assessment because of the cost associated with such a disclosure. Only when the benefit of disclosure outweighs the cost will a firm choose to disclose the self-assessment. Our first set of hypotheses concerns the relationship between government ownership and voluntary IC disclosure with the auditor"s attestation. With the completion of the SSSR, the state shares became tradable. Hence, the insurance role of government ownership is less important and investors would require firms to be more transparent to offset the perception of increased risk. In addition, the government as the controlling shareholder may be less greedy than families as the controlling shareholders because the government has important objectivesto pursue, such as to establish the modern enterprise system and improve the market environment. Furthermore, to make firms more transparent is also in the interests of the government as it is likely to be an ineffective monitor of managers, owing to capability and incentive problems. There is substantial anecdotal evidence that managers of the government-controlled firms abuse their power and misuse company money at the expense of shareholders in China. 7 To have an effective IC system and to disclose an IC report with an auditor"s attestation can make monitoring easier for the government. Finally, there is also an increasing pressure on the management of SOEs by the public to behave themselves. 8 This can explain why the CSRC and other relevant government agencies are enthusiastic to issue and enforce the IC standards. Hence, we have the following hypothesis:
H1a: Ceteris paribus, firms controlled by the government are more likely to issue IC selfassessment reports and to attain an auditor"s attestation.
More specifically, government ownership can be classified into local-and central- At the same time, the CNOC cited the increasing international oil price to justify its gasoline-price hike (The Market Daily, July 14th 2007). Li Shizhong, the chairman of the supervisory board on large SOEs, pointed out that many SOE managers were doing tunneling that resulted in a serious loss of state assets (see China Economic News, 2003, No. 12, p. 38) .
voluntarily disclose the IC report and to have an auditor"s attestation on it than centralgovernment-controlled firms do. We thus further hypothesize:
H1b:Ceteris paribus, firms controlled by the central government are more likely to issue IC selfassessment reports and to attain an auditor"s attestation than those controlled by local governments.
Our second hypothesis concerns the relationship between institutional, especially mutualfund, shareholdings and voluntary IC disclosure. Bronson et al. (2006) argue that institutional shareholders are tough monitors and thereby require firms to release their IC reports. However, Deumes and Knechel (2008) argue that institutional shareholders are effectively monitors, and therefore can substitute for IC reports. Given that the majority of listed firms have a controlling shareholder in China, we believe IC-report disclosure can help not only individual investors, but also institutional investors, to resist the controlling shareholder expropriation. Since the institutional investors are non-controlling shareholders and many (such as mutual funds) are even professional investors, they have the incentive to require IC disclosure with an auditor"s attestation, especially when firms have IC weaknesses. In fact, they demand a firm to be more transparent when it is perceived to be more risky. Hence, we hypothesize:
H2:Ceteris paribus, firms having more mutual fund shareholdings are more likely to disclose self-assessment on IC and to have an auditor"s attestation.
It is possible that mutual funds use their existing holdings to press the companies to disclose IC self-assessment reports and to have an auditor"s attestation on them. It is also possible that mutual funds buy into the companies with IC self-assessment disclosure and an auditor"s attestation. Either way we should observe a positive association between the mutual fund shareholding and the likelihood of IC self-assessment disclosure with an audit attestation.
Even if mutual funds just buy into firms with voluntary IC disclosure, this pressuresfirms to disclose anIC report and have an auditor"s attestation on it.
Our third set of hypotheses is regarding the relationship between voluntary IC reporting with an auditor"s attestation and SEOs. When firms plan to raise additional equity in the market, they
should have a strong incentive to issue more detailed IC reports and to attain an auditor"s attestation, especially when the firm has no IC weakness. With information asymmetry, SEOs can easily be interpreted as a bad signal by the market. In addition, there is evidence of pervasive earnings management associated with SEOs before our sample period (see Yuan 2004 and Yu et al. 2006) . Voluntarily releasing of IC reports can reduce information asymmetry, curtail agency problems, enhance the credibility of issuers and make SEOs more successful. Attaining an auditor"s attestation can further enhance the credibility of IC reports. Therefore, we arrived at the following hypothesis:
H3a: Ceteris paribus, firms having equity-refinancing intentions are more likely to issue IC self -assessment reports and to have an auditor"s attestation on the IC report.
Since private firms are generally less transparent and less likely to disclose IC information than government-controlled firms, they have to spend more effort to disclose IC information and make it credible when they plan to raise new equity capital. This is because the government-controlled firm may have done the disclosure even if they do not have an equity refinancing plan. Hence, we further hypothesize:
H3b: When planning to have equity-refinancing in the market, non-government-controlled firms are more likely to issue IC self-assessment reports and to have an auditor"s attestation on the IC report than government-controlled firms.
However, H3a and H3b may not hold for firms with IC weaknesses, as they usually do not want to have SEOs under such circumstances.
DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
The sample of this study consists of all firms listed on SSE during the period 2006-10. All publicly traded firms in China use December as the fiscal year-end. We obtained all financial and market data from the RESSET and CSMAR Databases. IC information is hand-collected from annual reports.
We started with 4,172 firm-year observations during our sample period 2006-10 9 . After excluding firms in the financial industry and firms with missing values, our final sample included 3,994 firm-year observations. Panel A of Table 1 both IC self-assessment disclosure and the auditor"s attestation. It is obvious that more SOEs, both in terms of number and percentage, disclose and disclose with an auditor"s attestation in the first three years than Non-SOEs, indicating SOEs move to disclose in a faster and more massive way. Overall, about 59% of SOEs had disclosed an IC self-assessment report in 2010, while the percentage for non-SOEs is about 47%. The cumulative proportion of SOEs that both disclose and attain the auditor"s attestation was about 34% in 2010 and about 24% for non-SOEs.This is consistent with our conjecture that firms with government as the control shareholder are more 10 A legitimate question is who decides what information constitutes weakness? We do think it involves some subjective judgment and may vary across firms. However, it should be safe to assume that, on average, the IC quality should be worse for those who report IC weaknesses than for those who do not. 11 For example, Zhuhai Boyuan Investment Co., Ltd. stated in 2010 that there were deficiencies in its IC system which should be amended. Shanghai Jinqiao Export Processing Zone Development Co., Ltd. disclosed in 2010 that it was short of internal auditing staff and its fixed asset accounting is inaccurate.
likely to disclose anIC self-assessment report and to attain an auditor"s attestation.
[Insert Table 1 In fact, the three models are otherwise the same except the Logit variable, ICVD, is defined differently. In Model 1, we setICVD it to 1 if firm i discloses its IC self-assessment report at year t no matter whether there is an auditor"s attestation attained or not, and zero otherwise. This is to examine the choice between disclosure and no-disclosure or the likelihood to disclose IC self-assessment versus not to disclose. In Model 2, we first excludeall firms that do not disclose anIC self-assessment report in year t, then set ICVD it to 1 if firm i attains an auditor"s attestation to its IC self-assessment report, and zero otherwise. This is to examine the choice between disclosure only and disclosure with an attestation or the likelihood to attain an auditor"s attestation among disclosers. Finally in Model 3, we define a Multinomial Logit variable, MLogit(ICVD it ). Instead of being binary, it iscategorized into three groups: ICVD0 represents firms with no IC selfassessment report at all, which serves as the benchmark; ICVD1 represents firms with an IC selfassessment report only; and ICVD2 represents firms with both an IC self-assessment report and an auditor"s attestation. Since ICVD0 is used as the benchmark, we replace ICVD with ICVD1
and set it equal to 1 if firm i is in the category of ICVD1 in year t, and zero otherwise. Similarly, we replace ICVD with ICVD2 and set it equal to 1 if firm i is in the category of ICVD2 in year t, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable, Logit(ICVD it ), measures the likelihood of firm i having ICVD1 and ICVD2 in year t. Hence, there are two simultaneously estimated equations in the Multinomial Logit regression model: one examines whether a firm discloses its IC selfassessment report only without attaining an auditor"s attestation, and the other examines whether a firm has both a self-assessment disclosure and an auditor"s attestation. We also compare the impacts of the same test variable in the two equations of our Multinomial Logistic framework.
With these three models, we can examine the likelihood for all the possible decisions regarding disclosure and attaining an auditor"s attestation.
Since attaining an auditor"s attestation is done merelyto make the IC self-assessment report more convincing, we use the same set of independent variables in all models. SEO is a dummy variable proxy for the future SEO plan. The gestation period for a typical SEO is usually between 5 and 10 months if the starting point is set as the board decision date to issue SEO, although the gestation period for some firms can be longer than a year. Hence, SEO is set equal to 1 if a firm makes SEOs in the next fiscal year, and zero otherwise. FUND it is defined as the number of shares held by a mutual fund among the top-10 shareholders divided by total number of shares in firm i at the end of year t. GOV is also a dummy variable serving as a proxy for government to estimate both equations, they may have different impacts in different equations. Table 2 presents the definition of all these variables.
[Insert Table 2 here]
If our first hypothesis H1 is correct, then the estimated coefficient for the GOV dummy should be positive and significant, as the government owner either has incentives or is pressed to force managers to disclose an IC self-assessment report and to attain an auditor"s attestation. The interactive term CENTRAL*GOV is included to distinguish the central government from the local governments. With this interactive term, we can test H1b, whether central-governmentcontrolled firms are more likely to have IC disclosure with an auditor"s attestation than localgovernment-controlled firms. If H2 is correct, then the coefficients of FUND should be positive and significant, as the hypothesis says that the mutual funds prefer the firms be more transparent and may force firms to release more IC information. If H3a is correct, then the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable SEO should be positive and significant, as the plan to raise equity capital in the market gives incentives to voluntarily disclosure of the IC self-assessment report and to have an auditor"s attestation. The interactive dummy GOV*SEO can further help us to test if the incentive for IC disclosure with an audit attestation is the same for governmentcontrolled and private firms when firms plan to have SEOs.
Following previous studies, we include the natural logarithm of firm size (SIZE), the operating-revenue growth rate (GROW), leverage (LEV), inventory as a percentage of total assets (INV), and profitability (ROE) as control variables in our regressions. Both Bronson et al. (2006) and Deumes and Knechel (2008) argue that large firms are more opaque and have the incentive to use IC reports to increase transparency in public, and they also find evidence that firm size is positively related to the likelihood of IC disclosure. Kinney and McDaniel (1989) and Bronson et al. (2006) argue that rapidly growing firms have IC systems that fail to meet an increase in customer demand or entry into a new market.
However, the predicted impact of GROW on IC disclosure could go either way. On the one hand, managers may choose to hide the possible IC weaknesses by not disclosing. On the other hand, the investors may strongly demand these firms disclose their IC reports. Bronson et al. (2006) hypothesize that LEV should have a positive impact on the likelihood of disclosing the IC report as debt holders prefer firms to be more transparent. Deumes and Knechel (2008) argue that LEV, ROE, and INV can affect the inherent risk within a firm.
However, their impact on the IC disclosure can also go either way. For example, lenders, especially banks, are effective monitors with less information disadvantage, and thus may be a good substitute for the IC disclosure. This is likely the case in China as listed firms mainly borrow from banks and the corporate debt market is very small during our sample period.
To control for the possible impact of an alternative corporate-governance mechanism on voluntary IC disclosure, we include in the regression the percentage of independent directors on the board (INDIR), whether the firm is audited by one of the "Big 4" accounting firms (BIG4), and whether the firm is cross-listed in New York (CLIST). It is reasonable to assume that a firm with a higher percentage of independent directors on the board, with a dual-listing in New York or NASQAQ, and with a BIG4 firm as its auditor, should have better corporate governance.
However, as argued by Deumes and Knechel, good corporate governance may either be a complement to or substitute for IC disclosure. Deumes and Knechel use dummy variables to control for industry effect, but we use the industry average MBR (IndMBR) instead, as it is more succinct. In addition, we control for the maturity of the firm (AGE) and the year-specific effect (YRDummies).
Since our simple Logit and Multinomial-Logit Regressions use pooled data, we follow Petersen (2009) 12 to control for time-series dependence by adjusting the standard errors for clustering on each company.
[Insert Table 3 here] Table 3a presents descriptive statistics for all variables included in our LOGIT regressions.
On average, slightly more than 10% of firms had SEOs in the next fiscal year during our sample period. The mutual funds investors among the top-10 largest shareholders held an average of 3% of shares. The government was the largest shareholder in 67% of the firms. However, the central government was the largest shareholder for 17.2%. Only 7% of the firms were audited by BIG4 13 , and the average listing time for a firm is around 9.3 years. All variables show a reasonable dispersion. Table 3b shows the mean and medians of our test variables across different groupings of firms with IC weaknesses. For instance, among 153 firms with IC weaknesses, 7.2% had SEOs planned for the following year; mutual funds on average held 3.2% of shares. Among 51 firms having IC weaknesses, but also disclosing IC self-assessments, three (5.9%) had SEOs planned for the following year; mutual funds held about 5.3%. Among the 19 firms with weaknesses, but having both IC disclosure and audit attestation, three (15.7%) had SEOs planned for the following year; mutual funds held about 5.1%. This means that, even with IC weaknesses, some firms still disclose an IC report with audit attestation and have an equity-refinancing plan.
[Insert Table 4 here] 12 In this study, we run all logistic regressions with clustered standard errors using the programming advice from Professor Mitchell A. Petersen"s website, which is available at the link below: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/se/se_programming.htm. 13 In terms of audit fees charged, the share for Big4 is on average about 50% during our sample period.
We have examined the Pearson correlation coefficients between all these variables. As shown in Table 4 , most correlation coefficients between independent variables are below 0.32, except the one between SIZE and BIG4, which is 0.45 (still not too high). Hence, multicollinearity is not a serious problem in our analysis.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The Logitregression results for the full sample are reported in Table 5 . To save space, we do not present year dummies and constants. For Model 1, many variables suggested by the previous authors are highly significant. Firstly, as reported in both Bronson et al. (2006) and Deumes and Knechel (2008) , the estimated coefficient for SIZE is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that the IC for large firms is more complicated and therefore needs to be disclosed to reduce information asymmetry. Secondly, the estimated coefficient for LEV is negative and significant at the 1% level, 14 which is inconsistent with the findings in Deumes and Knechel (2008) . However, as argued by the same authors, this is possible, as lenders may provide a monitoring role that can substitute for the disclosure of an IC report. We argue that this is more likely the case in China as the corporate debt market is very small up until now. Banks are the major lenders. They have less information asymmetry and more incentive to monitor the firms. Thirdly, the positive and significant estimate for CLIST indicates that firms" cross-listings in New York may have high standards for corporate governance and are more likely to have an IC self-assessment report. Fourthly, the estimated coefficient for INV is positive and significant, suggesting that firms with high inventory levels have an incentive to disclose an IC report in order to reduce information asymmetry. Finally, AGE has a negative and highly significant coefficient, indicating that more mature firms may have a long financial record, which makes them subject to less information asymmetry; therefore, they can substitute, to a certain extent, for IC disclosure.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Now we examinetheestimated coefficients for our test variables in Model 1.First, the estimate for GOV is positive but insignificant, which suggests that firms controlled by local governments are not more likely to disclose an IC self-assessment report than private firms.
However, as expected, the estimate for GOV*CENTRL is positive and significant at the 5 percent level, indicating that firms controlled by the central government are more likely to release an IC self-assessment report than other firms. These findings lend support to H1bbut not H1a. Second, the positive and highly significant estimates for FUND and SEO strongly support our H2, that mutual funds prefer firms to be more transparent, and H3a, that firms have an incentive to release the IC self-assessment if they have an SEO planned for the following year.
Since the government-controlled firms are more likely to disclose self-assessment and face less information asymmetry in general, it is possible that private firms have relatively stronger incentives to enhance their transparency when they plan to raise new equity. In that case, the estimate for GOV*SEO should be negative and significant. However, the estimated coefficient for GOV*SEO in Model 1 is insignificant although negative, suggesting that private firms are not necessarily more likely to disclose IC self-assessment reports when they plan to raise new equity, which is inconsistent with our H3b.This finding is robust when we replace GOV*SEO with CENTRL*GOV*SEO.
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From Model 2 we see that the estimated coefficients for Fund and Central*GOV are positive and highly significant, and the estimated coefficient for GOV is also positive and 15 Results are not reported to save space but available upon request from the authors. marginally significant at the 10% level. These findings indicate that both government control and mutual fund ownership have positive influences on the likelihood of a firm to further attain an auditor"s attestation on the IC self-assessment report among all disclosing firms, which is consistent with our H1a, H1b, and H2. However, the estimated coefficients for SEO and GOV*SEO are not statistically significant, which isinconsistent with our H3a and H3b.
Interestingly, the estimated coefficients for SIZE, LEV, CLIST, and INV which are significant in Model 1 are not significant in Model 2. This suggests that once a firm has disclosed its IC selfassessment report, the firm size, leverage, etc. will not affect its decision to attain an auditor"s attestation. However, AGE is still statistically significantly and negativelyrelated to the likelihoodofattaining an auditor"s attestation. In addition, BIG4 has a negative and significant estimated coefficient in Model 2, suggesting reputable auditors are a substitute for attaining an auditor"s attestationon the IC self-assessment report.
We further look at the Model 3 results in columns 3, 4, and 5. As mentioned earlier, our multi-nominal Logit model estimates two equations simultaneously. The first equation as reported in column 3 examines the likelihood ofadecision to stay non-disclosing or to only disclose the IC self-assessment report without attaining an auditor"s attestation. The second one as reported in column 4 examines the likelihood ofadecision to stay non-disclosing or to disclose with an auditor"s attestation attained. From column 3 we see all estimated coefficients for our test variables are statistically insignificant. This is in contrast with the results in model 1 where most of the coefficients of our test variables are significant. On the other hand, most other variables which have significant estimated coefficients in model 1 still havesignificantcoefficients in column 3. In addition, BIG4 and INV are positively and statistically significantly related to the likelihood to disclose the IC self-assessment report without attaining an auditor"s attestation. These findings indicate that our test variables may be more related to the likelihood of disclosurewith an auditor"s attestation rather than pure disclosure of IC self-assessment without attaining an attestation. The results reported in column 4 confirm this is the case. Here we see all our test variable estimates are significant and with expected signs. The progressively more positive and significant estimates for GOV and Central*GOV indicate that government-controlled firms are more likely to disclose an IC selfassessment report and to attain an auditor"s attestation than private firms, while firms controlled by the central government areeven more likely to do so. These findings lend strong support to our H1a and H1b. The positive and highly significant estimate for FUND indicates that mutual fund holdings are positively related to the decision forIC disclosure with an auditor"s attestation, which is consistent with H2. In fact, H2 has the strongest support from the empirical results as the estimate for FUND is also significant in Models 1 and 2. Although the estimate for GOV*SEO is negative butinsignificant as in models 1 and 2, we find it negative and significant here indicating Non-SOEs are more likely to disclose IC information with an auditor"s attestation when they plan to have SEOs..This is consistent with H3b. 16 Column 5 in Table 5 further shows the test for equality between the estimated coefficients for our test variables in Columns 3 and 4.
It shows thatthe estimates for FUND, GOV, CENTRAL*GOV,and GOV*SEO are significantly different between the two equations, which is consistent with the results reported in Columns 3 and 4. The estimates of control variables are qualitatively the same as those in models 1 and 2, and in column 3.
As pointed out earlier, no firm reported IC weaknesses/deficiencies during the period 2006 -08, but there are firms that reported IC weaknesses/deficiencies during the period 2009-10. In 16 Again this finding is robust when we replace GOV*SEO with CENTRAL*GOV*SEO. The results are not reported to save space.
addition, we find that some firms with IC weaknesses/deficiencies also had SEOs planned for the following year, have the government as their controlling shareholder, and have mutual fund investors among the top-10 shareholders. Hence, we used the data in the subsample period 2009-10 to rerun the same Logit regressions and report the results in Table 6 . As shown in the table, the multi-nominal Logit regression results are qualitatively the same as those in Table 5 Consideredtogether, these results indicate that SEO, FUND, and CENTRAL*GOV can still explain the disclosure of an IC self-assessment report and to attain an auditor"s attestation even when some firms have IC weaknesses.
[Insert Table 6 here]
To further examine the identification problem, we repeat the Logitregressions for the subsample of 153 firms with IC weaknesses reported during the period 2009-10,and the results are shown in Table 7 . Now the estimated coefficients are somewhat different comparing to those reported in Tables 5 and 6 . Firstly, the estimate for SEO is negative and significant for both Models 1 and 3. This means that firms with IC weaknessestend not to disclose IC selfassessment reports and attain the auditor"s attestation. This is understandable as not many firms would like to have SEOs under such circumstances. Secondly, the estimated coefficient for FUND is positive and highly significant in Model 1 and the first equation in the multi-nominal Logit model (Model 3). The estimated coefficient for FUND in the second equation is positive with a t-value of 1.60, which is almost significant at the 10% level. 17 These findings are generally consistent with our H2 and lend supportto our conjecture that mutual funds are 17 The marginally insignificant estimate for FUND may be due to the small sample size.
concerned more with the transparency of a firm"s IC when the firm has IC weakness/deficiency.Thirdly, the estimated coefficients for GOV and GOV*CENTRAL are insignificant. This means that the government, as the controlling shareholder, wants to use IC disclosure and the associated auditor"s attestation to force management to work harder, to meet higher standards; however, when the firm already has IC weaknesses, thesegovernmentcontrolled firms are not more likely to disclose IC information than private firms.Fourthly, the estimated coefficient for GOV*SEO is highly positive and significant in column 2, suggesting that with IC weaknesses, the government-controlled firms are more likely to disclose the IC selfassessment report with an auditor"s attestation than private firms if they still plan to have SEOs.
This is possible as private firms may not be able to have SEOs in such a situation. Finally, for other variables, SIZE, CLIST, AGE and BIG4 have estimates similar tothose reported in previous tables, while LEV and INV become insignificant. On the other hand, GROW is negative and significant in Models 1 and 3, indicating high-growth firms with IC weaknesses are less likely to disclose and to attain an auditor"s attestation to the IC report, which is reasonable.
[Insert Table 7 here]
In view of all the results in Tables 5, 6 , and 7, we can conclude that GOV (especially GOV*CENTRAL),FUND, and SEO tend to explain why firms would like to disclose the IC selfassessment report in general and disclose the IC self-assessment report with an auditor"s attestation in particular. GOV, Central*GOV, and FUND can also explain why firms with IC disclosure would like to further attain an auditor"s attestation, but they do not explain why firms would like to disclose the IC self-assessment report without attaining an auditor"s attestation.
However, the traditional factors documented in the previous studies, such as SIZE, LEV, corporate governance proxies, etc., are still the determinants for the voluntary disclosure of self-assessment reports.They are also the determinants for voluntary disclosure with an auditor"s attestation. In addition, GOV, SEO and FUDN can explain the likelihood of disclosure of selfassessment reports and ofattaining an auditor"s attestation even when some firms have IC weaknesses. Particularly, FUND has the explanation power for the disclosure of self-assessment reports and for attaining an auditor"s attestation for a sub-sample of firms that all haveIC weaknesses.This indicates that a firm"s IC disclosure decision is not just based on whether the firm has IC weakness or not.
ADDITIONAL TESTS
Some argue that the scale of the SEO may be more relevant to the decision regarding whether to make an IC disclosure and to attain an auditor"s attestation. As a robustness check, we replace the SEO dummy with SEOSCALE, which is defined as the SEO proceeds issued by a firm divided by its total assets, and rerun all the regressions. The results are qualitatively the same. We do not include both SEO and SEOSCALE in the same regression, as we find that the correlation coefficient between them is 0.64, which is also statistically significant at the 1% level.
It is also possible that firms with poor credibility may choose to attain an auditor"s attestations on their reports to enhance their credibility. To look into this possibility, we include an additional dummy variable PENALTY in the regression. PENALTY is set to 1 if the firm has been punished for accounting fraud or information-disclosure irregularities in the previous year, and zero otherwise. Alternatively, we set PENALTY equal to 1 if the firm had a non-clean auditor opinion in the previous year, and zero otherwise. We argue that these firms may have the incentive to hire an auditor to attest to the validity of their IC report. However, the estimated coefficient for PENALTY is unanimously insignificant.
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In Tables 5 and 6 , we find that the estimated coefficient for LEV is mostly negative and significant. This is consistent with the argument that debtor monitoring could be a good substitute for IC disclosure. We argue this is more likely the case in China as bank loans are the major form of firm liabilities and the corporate debt market is very limited. However, it is a fact that SOEs in China have easier access to bank loans than private firms. It is possible that SOEs in general are of better quality. However, it is also argued that they enjoy de facto loan guarantees from the government. This implies that banks may not monitor these firms closely. If this is true, then LEV should not be a good substitute for IC disclosure as banks may not be effectivein mitigatingthe information asymmetry between the firm and its stakeholders. To investigate this possibility we rerun the regressions by adding an interactive dummy, LEV*GOV.
If banks cannot substitute for IC disclosure, then the estimated coefficient for LEV*GOV should be positive and significant. However, we find the estimate is mostly negative and sometimes significant, indicating banks monitor SOEs closely too.
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Finally, we take a further look at the relationship between FUND and the disclosure decision. Are mutual fund investors leading the disclosures or following the disclosures?A firm"s IC disclosure comes out with its annual report. Since the annual report for year t is usually released before April 30 of year t+1, FUND t should lead IC disclosure as the mutual fund should know its investment in a company at any time. To examine whether mutual funds are leaders or followers, we include FUND t+1 inour Logit analyses and repeat the regressions. If mutual funds are leaders, then the estimated coefficient for FUND t should be positive and significant;if they are followers, the estimated coefficient for FUND t+1 should be positive and significant. If both estimates are positive and significant, then there exists a bi-directional relationship. In unreported results, we find that the estimate for FUND t is positiveand significant but it is not for FUND t+1 .Hence, the results support the conjecture that mutual fund investors invest in a firm and press it to disclose IC information. However, there is a caveat:FUND t and FUND t+1 are highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.72,which is significant at the 1 percent level.
Although multicollinearity will not bias the estimation,it may make the t-statistics inaccurate.
CONCLUSION
Using a unique data set from the SSE during the period 2006-10, we examined the determinants and/or incentives for a firm"s voluntary IC-disclosure decision, as well as its decision additionally to have an auditor"s attestation on the IC report. We hypothesize and find supporting evidence that a firm with the government, especially the central government, as its largest shareholder,with more mutualfund shareholdings, and with an equity refinancing plan in the near future, is more likely to disclose an IC self-assessment report and to attain an auditor"s attestation on the report.
Our study contributes incrementally to the literature in several ways. Firstly, we study not only the determinants of voluntary disclosure of IC information, but also the determinants of voluntarily having the auditor"s attestation on the IC report. This latter part is new in the literature. The decision to have an auditor"s attestation on an IC report is important, especially in developing countries, as it can further enhance the credibility of the report. Secondly, our finding that an IC report with an auditor"s attestation can facilitate seasoned-equity issuing is also new in the literature. Our study shows that credible and voluntary disclosure of IC self-assessment has some signaling effect in the market. Thirdly, our sample includes firms with IC weaknesses. This allows us to address the identification problem that previous studies have not addressed. Our finding is that mutual-fund investors have a positive impact on the credible disclosure of IC reports even when the firm has shown IC weakness. This is an affirmation that mutual funds can play a role in enhancing effective corporate governance. It is also an affirmation of the efforts on the part of the CSRC to develop a mutual-fund industry in China. ICVD in Model 1 is set 1 if a firm disclosesthe IC self-assessment report, and zero otherwise. In Model 2 all non-disclosures are deleted. Then ICVD is set to 1 if a firm attains an auditor"s attestation on the IC self-assessment report, and zero otherwise. ICVD in Model 3is categorized into three groups: ICVD0 represents firms with no IC self-assessment report at all, which serves as the benchmark; ICVD1 represents firms with only an IC self-assessment report; and ICVD2 represents firms with both an IC selfassessment report and the auditor"s attestation. Since ICVD0 is used as the benchmark, we replace ICVD with ICVD1 and set it equal to 1 if the firm is in the category of ICVD1, and zero otherwise. Similarly, we replace ICVD with ICVD2 and set it equal to 1 if the firm is in the category of ICVD2.
SEO=
A dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a firm makes seasoned equity offerings in the next fiscal year, and zero otherwise.
FUND=
The number of tradable shares held by mutual-fund institutions among the ten largest shareholders, divided by total tradable shares at the end of year t.
GOV=
A dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is the government (including both central government and local governments), and zero otherwise.
CENTRAL=
A dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is the central government, and zero otherwise.
SIZE=
The natural logarithm of total assets at the end of year t.
GROW=
The change in operating revenue from year t-1 to year t divided by operating revenue at year t-1.
ROE=
Return on equity for year t.
LEV=
Total liability divided by total assets.
INDIR=
The ratio of the number of independent outside directors to total number of directors.
CLIST=
A dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a firm"s shares are cross-listed in the US in addition to SSE, and zero otherwise.
BIG 4=
A dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a firm"s auditor is one of the big four accounting firms, and zero otherwise.
INV=
Book value of inventory divided by total assets. AGE= A firm"s age is measured as the number of years since it was listed on the SSE.
IndustryMBR=
The median of market-to-book ratio for each industry. Table 2 (both panels A and B) is the total assets (in million RMB) at year-end. 
Table 5 Multinomial Regression Results for 2006-2010
This table presents the results of logistic regressions for the full sample period. Model 1 is a simple logistic regression examining the likelihood of disclosing IC self-assessment report. Model 2 is also a simple logistic regression examining the likelihood to attain an auditor"s attestation on the self-assessment report among disclosers. Model 3 is for multinomial logistic regressions, we use non-disclosers as our reference group, and examine the likelihoods simultaneously forfirms only disclosing IC self-assessment report (ICVD 1 ) and for firms both disclosing the IC self-assessment report and attaining an auditor"s attestation (ICVD 2 ) on the report. Estimated coefficients and z statistics (in parentheses) are reported. 17.67% 21.99% Note:*, **, and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Table 6 Multinomial Regression Results for 2009-2010
This table presents the results of logistic regressions for the period 2009-2010. Model 1 is a simple logistic regression examining the likelihood of disclosing IC self-assessment report. Model 2 is also a simple logistic regression examining the likelihood to attain an auditor"s attestation on the self-assessment report among disclosers. Model 3 is for multinomial logistic regressions, we use non-disclosers as our reference group, and examine the likelihoods simultaneously forfirms only disclosing IC self-assessment report (ICVD 1 ) and for firms both disclosing the IC self-assessment report and attaining an auditor"s attestation (ICVD 2 ) on the report. Estimated coefficients and z statistics (in parentheses) are reported. 11.96% 15.47% Note:*, **, and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Table 7 Multinomial Regression Results for Firms with IC Weaknesses (2009-10)
This table presents the results of logistic regressions for firms with IC weaknesses. Model 1 is a simple logistic regression examining the likelihood of disclosing IC self-assessment report. Model 2 is also a simple logistic regression examining the likelihood to attain an auditor"s attestation on the self-assessment report among disclosers. Model 3 is for multinomial logistic regressions, we use non-disclosers as our reference group, and examine the likelihoods simultaneously forfirms only disclosing IC self-assessment report (ICVD 1 ) and for firms both disclosing the IC self-assessment report and attaining an auditor"s attestation (ICVD 2 ) on the report. Estimated coefficients and z statistics (in parentheses) are reported.
Separate logistic Regressions Multinomiallogistic regressions (Model 3) Model1
Discloser versus nondisclosers
Model2
Selfassessmentreport only versus Self-assessment report with auditor"s attestation
Selfassessmentreport only versus non-disclosers (ICVD 1 )
Self-assessment report with auditor"s attestationversus non-disclosers (ICVD 2 ) 33.91% 32.20% Note:*, **, and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
